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1. The breadth and scope of Karl Llewellyn's lifetime of experiences and work is remarkable in today's
era of legal concentration and specialization. Llewellyn's contributions, whether in his academic, professional
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the American Legal Realist School. Although American legal realism is no longer the
predominant school of jurisprudence in the United States, it still plays an important role
in the formation of our legal traditions. Consider President Obama's recent statement
concerning the candidate successfully nominated to the United States Supreme Court:
I will seek someone who understands that justice isn't about some abstract legal
theory or footnote in a case book, it is also about how our laws affect the daily re-
alities of people's lives, whether they can make a living, and care for their fami-
lies, whether they feel safe in their homes, and welcome in their own nation.3
Several of Llewellyn's contemporaries in the American legal academy, including
Arthur Corbin,4 Jerome Franks and Roscoe Pound 6 have been cited as influences on his
or personal life, are demonstrative of a unique ability to approach situations with a new and revolutionary per-
spective. Throughout his life, Llewellyn compiled an impressive and lengthy list of "singular" accomplish-
ments, including but not limited to: the only American ever to have been awarded the Iron Cross; the most fer-
tile and inventive legal scholar of his generation; legal theory's most colorful personality since Jeremy
Bentham, the only common lawyer known to have collaborated successfully with an anthropologist on a major
work; a rare example of a law-teacher poet; the chief architect of the most ambitious law code of recent times;
the most romantic of legal realists and the most down-to-earth of legal theorists; the most ardently evangelical
of legal skeptics; the most unmethodical of methodologists; the least controvertible of claims, the possessor of
one of the most exotic prose styles in all legal literature. See ROBERT WHITMAN, SOIA MENTSCHIKOFF & KARL
LLEWELLYN: A COMPILATION OF ARTICLES ABOUT Two ICONIC LAW PROFESSORS (The Graduate Group
2011); Karl Llewellyn & William Twining, Two Works of Karl Llewellyn, 30 MOD. L. REV. 514, 514-15
(1967). See also N. E. H. HULL, ROSCOE POUND AND KARL LLEWELLYN: SEARCHING FOR AN AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE 224 (1997). As Dean of Harvard Law School, Roscoe Pound is one of the most influential
figures in the American legal realism. Roscoe Pound was both Llewellyn's critic and ally. "[H]e was also the
mentor of a generation of jurisprudents, the patron of many young scholars, and the best-placed American aca-
demic jurisprudent of his time." Id.
2. See David E. Ingersoll, Karl Llewellyn, American Legal Realism, and Contemporary Legal Behavior-
alism, 76 ETHICS 253, 253 (1966). Jerome Frank was born in New York in 1889, and served as ajudge of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 1941. Llewellyn and Frank were close friends as well
as prominent figures in legal realist thought. Despite their deaths (1957 and 1962 respectively), their views
continue to influence many legal theories today. Id. at 253-54. In describing legal realism, Ingersoll notes that
the realists performed an extremely valuable and successful "ground-breaking" task in introducing social sci-
ence methodology in legal scholarship. Indeed, when one compares the assumptions and the concepts of con-
temporary legal behavioralism with those of the realists, one is stuck by an amazing similarity. It appears as
though the modem "radicals" of legal scholarship are very much the intellectual progeny of the old realists. Id.
at 253. Legal realism is also thought of as having influenced or having the led the way for the infusion of eco-
nomic analysis into contemporary legal thought. See, e.g., Kristoffel R. Grechenig & Martin Gelter, The Trans-
atlantic Divergence in Legal Thought: American Law and Economics vs. German Doctrinalism, 31 HASTINGS
COMP. & INT'L L. REV. 295, 316-19 (2008) (arguing that the widespread acceptance of realist ideas was a pre-
condition for the success of economic analysis of law); Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CALIF.
L. REV. 465, 516 (1988) (reviewing LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927-1960 (1986)) ("[theo-
ries] associated with legal process, rights theory, and law and economics all attempt to absorb the insights of
legal realism . . . .").
3. Jake Tapper & Sunlen Miller, POTUS Interrupts Press Briefing to Announce Souter's Retirement, An-
nounce Qualifications for Next Supreme, ABC NEWS (May 1, 2009, 3:45 PM). In his May I statement, Presi-
dent Obama also stated:
I view that quality of empathy, of understanding and identifying with people's hopes and struggles,
as an essential ingredient for arriving as just decisions and outcomes. I will seek somebody who is
dedicated to the rule, who honors our constitutional traditions, who respects the integrity of the judi-
cial process and the appropriate limits of the judicial role. I will seek somebody who shares my re-
spect for constitutional values on which this nation was founded and who brings a thoughtful under-
standing of how to apply them in our time.
Id.
4. Early Years, 1869-1916, Arthur L. Corbin, YALE LAW SCHOOL, http://www.law.yale.edu/cbl/3075.htm
(last visited July 8, 2012). Even though Llewellyn referred to Corbin as "Dad" and considered him a "Realist,"
Corbin never formally accepted the realist label. Instead, he responded to Llewellyn: "I can join cheerfully with
you and your kind of 'Realism' but I never wanted to belong to the 'Realist School' or any other School (ex-
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thinking. Given his significant links with the German legal academy, it is not surprising
that Llewellyn's work appears also to have benefited from his acquaintance with the
work of German-speaking contemporaries and predecessors. In particular, Llewellyn's
debt to the work of Rudolf von Jhering7 deserves exploration.
The purpose of this Article is to shed light on the influence of Rudolf von Jhering
on Karl Llewellyn. Part I offers a brief overview of Llewellyn's life, education, major
work, and jurisprudential philosophy.8 Part 11 offers the same overview for Jhering. 9 Part
III gives a general account of the influence of German jurisprudence on American juri s-
prudential theory and thought. 10 Finally, Part IV surveys the recognized influence from
German jurisprudence on Llewellyn's work and examines Jhering's influence in partic u-
lar, with an emphasis on how Jhering may have affected Llewellyn's work on the Uni-
form Commercial Code.11
cept, perhaps, the Yale Law School)." Id. It is worth noting that Corbin supported Llewellyn's scholarship as
evidenced in his statement to Llewellyn, "your book will be welcomed by the judges and will sharpen their
mind as to their own style and method." HULL, supra note 1, at 337. See also Friedrich Kessler, Arthur Linton
Corbin, 78 YALE L.J. 517, 521 (1969) (describing how Arthur Corbin suggested that "the courts [should] return
to and cultivate what Karl Llewellyn called the Grand Style of decision making and abandon the Formal Style,
with its rigid and narrow adherence to formal logic.").
5. See Ingersoll, supra note 2, at 254.
6. Nathan Roscoe Pound was born in Lincoln, Nebraska in 1870. HULL, supra note 1, at 20. In 1916, he
became the dean of Harvard Law School. See id. at 113. His experience as dean notably shaped his views and
participation in the legal realist movement. Id at 256-57. Not only did Pound praise Llewellyn's work, but
together, Pound and Llewellyn began to question the legal system's role in society; "[t]hey began to develop a
'law in action' perspective which draws on a sociological conception of law. It draws attention to how law is
embedded in political, economic, and social contexts." BETTINA LANGE, IMPLEMENTING EU POLLUTION
CONTROL: LAW AND INTEGRATION 82 (2008).
7. Rudolf von Jhering contributed significantly to the American legal realism because his works were read
by notable American theorists such as Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Roscoe Pound, and Karl Llewellyn.
ROBERT S. SUMMERS, ESSAYS IN LEGAL THEORY 21 (2000). In 1881, Jhering wrote to a friend, stating:
". . . my writings are widely read even in the United States, and a review of my book, The Ends of Law, is the
most brilliant which has ever appeared about any of my works." Id. at 22. When Holmes stated that "the life of
the law has not been logic, it has been experience," he was inspired in part by Jhering's work. ALBERT W.
ALSCHULER, LAW WITHOUT VALUES: THE LIFE, WORK, AND LEGACYOF JUSTICE HOLMES 92 (2002) ("Jhering
wrote that legal conceptions did not dictate life but, instead, that life shaped them. He declared that law must
reflect not what logic, but what life, intercourse, the sense of right demand.").
8. See infra Part I. Three principal innovations marked Karl Llewellyn's jurisprudential philosophy:
[A]n expansion of the focus of casebooks, the principal teaching tools of law schools, to include
material other than judicial opinions; a greater emphasis on the degree to which decisions by legal
institutions, including judges, constituted exercises in social policy-making; and a transformation of
the relationship between individual cases and generalized principles in legal analysis.
G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 72 (1980).
9. See infra Part II.
10. See infra Part III.
11. See infra Part IV. See generally WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT
302-03 (Univ. of Okla. ed., Univ. of Okla. Press 1985) (1973); James Whitman, Commercial Law and the
American Volk: A Note on Llewellyn 's German Sources for the Uniform Commercial Code, 97 YALE L.J. 156,
156-59 (1987) (noting that the American Law Institute's Restatements and the Uniform Commercial Code
were outgrowths of German legal science).
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PART I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE LIFE AND WORK OF KARL LLEWELLYN
A. The Early Years of Karl Llewellyn: Life, Education, and Career
Karl Llewellyn was born in Seattle, Washington on May 22, 1893, and spent most
of his childhood and adolescence in Brooklyn, New York.12 Showing immense intellec-
tual promise, he graduated from high school at the age of sixteen. Because he was not
old enough to enroll as a student at Yale College, his father decided that he would benefit
from a period in Germany.1 3 Llewellyn happily spent the next three years boarding with
relatives of a family friend and attending the Realgymnasiuml4 at Schwerin, in Mecklen-
burg, Germany.
This time spent studying in Germany played an important role in Llewellyn's life,
because at a young age, he was intellectually, culturally, and socially stimulated. The
"German experience" enabled him to pursue his studies further with a wider range of
awareness, advancing his intellectual inquiry and creativity. This exposure proved par-
ticularly useful later in his academic career; Llewellyn was able to use this early experi-
ence and knowledge to gain popularity and respect amongst the leading German jurists
of the time.
By the time Karl Llewellyn left Mecklenburg, he was completely bilingual and
even fluent in the local German dialect.15 Before returning to the United States and en-
rolling in Yale College, Llewellyn spent a brief time at the University of Lausanne in
Switzerland.16 Then in 1914, Llewellyn ventured to Paris to study Latin, French, and
12. TWTNING, supra note 11, at 87.
13. Id. at 89; Michael Ansaldi, The German Llewellyn, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 705, 708 (1992).
14. TWINING, supra note 11, at 89. Around this time, Mecklenburg had six Realgymnasien and over a thou-
sand students. U.S. BUREAU OF EDUC., REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION 169 (1891) (noting that
Mecklenburg had seven gymnasia in 1889). Like other (historical) types of Gymnasium, a Realgymnasium was
a nine-year school that combined approximately the periods corresponding to middle school and high school in
the United States and allows students to subsequently advance to university education. Id See also Robert An-
derson, The Idea of the Secondary School in Nineteenth-Century Europe, 40 PAEDAGOGICA HISTORICA 93
(2004) (discussing the German Gymnasium and the French lycee as standards of structured, advanced second-
ary education).
15. TWINING, supra note 11, at 89. Karl Llewellyn also published several law articles and a book in Ger-
man. Albert Ehrenzweig was one of many distinguished jurists, who was of the opinion that he preferred
"Llewellyn's German to his English prose style." Id. Ehrenzweig was born in 1906 in Herzogenburg, Lower
Austria (a small town about 50 kilometers west of Vienna) into a family that brought forward several distin-
guished legal scholars. Making himself a name as a judge and scholar in Austria in the 1930s, he had to emi-
grate due to his Jewish ancestry in 1938. After obtaining U.S. law degrees at Columbia and the University of
Chicago, he served as the member of the staff of the Law Revision Commission of New York as well as a prac-
ticing attorney at the Cravath law firm in New York. In 1948, he was appointed to the faculty of the University
of California at Berkeley, where he became a leading authority on conflict of laws and tort law in the United
States. Ehrenzweig died in Berkeley in 1974. See Edward C. Halbach, Foreword, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 1419,
1419-20 (1966); John N. Hazard, In Memoriam, 22 AM. J. COMP. L. 603, 603 (1974); Richard W. Jennings et
al., In Memoriam Albert A. Ehrenzweig (1906-1974), 62 CALIF. L. REv. 1069 (1974); Walter Perry Johnson,
Albert Armin Ehrenzweig, Law: Berkeley 1906-1974 (Univ. of Cal. Academic Senate, Berkeley, Cal.), May
1977. Regarding Llewellyn's prose, see also Manfred Rehbinder, Einleitung des Herausgebers [Editor's Pref-
ace], Preface to KARL N. LLEWELLYN, RECHIT, RECHTSLEBEN UND GESELLSCHAFT 7-8 (1977) (noting that
Llewellyn developed the habit of creating new words also in the German language, e.g. "Trecht" as a term for
the law ("Recht") in action).
16. GEORGE W. LIEBMANN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: A COLLECTIVE PORTRAIT OF FIVE LEGAL
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law, and at the Sorbonne. 17 While there, war broke out and Llewellyn travelled to Ger-
many to attempt to enlist.18 While accompanying the 78th Prussian Infantry on the west-
ern front, he was wounded and spent three months in a military hospital before returning
to Yale.19 For his efforts, he was awarded the Iron Cross Second Class.20 His military
service and subsequent recognition solidified his affinity with the German culture.
Upon graduation from Yale College in 1915, Llewellyn entered Yale Law
School.21 This was an atypical time to be a student at Yale Law due to the transitory war
period; the school lost more than half of its students and faculty as a result of America's
entry into the war. As a result, Llewellyn "got little competition or stimulus from his fel-
lows." 22 On the other hand, Llewellyn was present at a time of much heated philosophi-
cal debate and change. He received personalized attention and instruction from the re-
maining faculty, particularly Arthur Corbin. 23
Soon, Llewellyn became the Editor-in-Chief of the Yale Law Journal and, reminis-
cent of the intellectual promise he showed as a high school student, graduated top of his
class.24 Upon graduation in the spring of 1919, Llewellyn taught commercial law at
Yale.25 That subject "remained, with jurisprudence, his great love." 26
Beginning in 1920, Llewellyn worked in the legal department of the National City
Bank, and then at the law firm of Shearman and Sterling, to which the Bank eventually
transferred its legal department.27 Llewellyn's transfer to Shearman & Sterling turned
out to be a perfect occurrence of events since it gave him the opportunity to work direct-
ly under William W. Lancaster, a leading authority on banking law of the time.28 Armed
SCHOLARS 151 (2005) Llewellyn spent about six months at the University of Lausanne. Id.
17. Id.
18. TwTNING, supra note 11, at 91.
19. Id.
20. LIEBMANN, supra note 16, at 152.
21. HULL, supra note 1, at 137.
22. TWTNING, supra note 11, at 94-95.
23. HULL, supra note 1, at 137. Llewellyn was Editor-in-Chief of the Yale Law Journal for three years. See
id. at 138. It is possible that Corbin saw great potential in Llewellyn and aspired to help him develop his legal
scholarship, especially since Llewellyn was a Yale College graduate. In the 1920s, Corbin worked with Dean
Swan to maintain highly promising, young Yale instructors as evidenced in the hiring of Alexander H. Frey,
assistant professor of Law at Yale, who supported Yale's Realist tradition. See LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL
REALISM AT YALE 1927-1960 100-01 (1986).
24. HULL, supra note 1, at 138.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Arthur L. Corbin, A Tribute to Karl Llewellyn, 71 YALE L.J. 805 (1962). Corbin noted:
Fully resolved to become a teacher and writer of the Law, he yet rejected an immediate position on
the Yale faculty, saying that he must first get experience of the law in action. For two years he was a
member of the then existing Legal Department of the National City Bank of New York, mastering
banking custom and commercial law. Increases in salary did not deter him from joining the law fac-
ulty. The Law School was then offering a course entitled "Introduction to Law," in the Department
of Anthropology and Sociology in Yale College. Karl took this on as part of his teaching, calling the
course "Law in Society." Deeply attached to Yale College and the Yale Law School, he fully in-
tended to continue here as a part of both.
Id.
28. TwINING, supra note 11, at 101. After working with William W. Lancaster, Llewellyn learned that
[T]he law in the books, at least in the commercial field, was 20 years or so behind the actual work
in practice, and I hooked up with the legal work of the National City Bank in the hope of finding out
what the law I had been teaching was all about.
HULL, supra note 1, at 138.
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with superior practical and theoretical legal experience, Llewellyn now possessed the
necessary tools to teach commercial law.
In 1923, Llewellyn became a law professor at Yale Law School. A year later, he
moved to Columbia Law School where his wife was a graduate student.29 This allowed
for close intellectual relationships with other Columbia faculty members, particularly
with Herman Oliphant.30 As a specialist in commercial law, Llewellyn was appointed as
Commissioner to the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
("NCCUSL"). 31 Among other important roles, he participated in drafting the Uniform
Chattel Mortgage Act and the Uniform Trust Receipts Act.32
Throughout the 1920s, "formalism" ruled American jurisprudence. Llewellyn be-
gan to shift some of his focus toward jurisprudence in an effort to depart "from a tough
taught tradition of doctrinal analysis." 33 One such example of Llewellyn's break from
formalism is his casebook on sales, serving as a classic non-formalist approach toward
the regulation of sales. 34
B. The Later Years of Karl Llewellyn: Scholarship and Philosophy
Karl Llewellyn's interest in legal jurisprudence further developed upon his return
to Germany in the late 1920s. 35 As a visiting professor at Leipzig in the winter term of
1928-29,36 Llewellyn started a series of lectures which were published five years later
under the title Prajudizienrecht und Rechtsprechung in Amerika [The Case Law System
in America].37 This work was translated into English in 1989.38 Meant as an introductory
29. HULL, supra note 1, at 138. Llewellyn married Elizabeth Sanford, who was then a graduate student in
economics at Columbia when he visited at Columbia Law School in 1924, while maintaining informal teaching
positions at Yale Law School. Id.
30. TwINING, supra note 11, at 103. Oliphant was a professor at Columbia who alongside Llewellyn served
as members of most important curriculum committees: business relations and methodology. See id Llewellyn
mostly agreed with Oliphant in their approach in organizing courses, particularly in the area of business rela-
tions. Id
31. Id. at 104.
32. Id. In addition to making significant contributions to commercial law, Karl Llewellyn also sought other
challenges, and he began involving himself in three main aspects of law: (1) anthropology and sociology
(1920s); (2) appellate judicial process and case law (1927); (3) concentration on the curriculum committees at
Columbia (late 1920's). Id. at 105-06. At the outset of his career at Columbia Law in 1925, Llewellyn set out
to put his theory into practice. Such examples are giving a series of lectures in Germany in 1928 as well as con-
tributing to the Columbia Law School through his involvement in the Columbia Law Review Symposium and
regular curriculum committee meetings.
33. Id. at 104.
34. Id. at 105. During this time, Llewellyn kept in close contact with Judge Cardozo and other judges. For
instance, Arthur Corbin's The Law and the Judges, was influential for Llewellyn. He also attended Judge
Cardozo's "Storrs Lectures on 'The nature of the Judicial Process."' Id. at 106. Cardozo was a prominent judi-
cial figure who played a major role in Llewellyn's interest regarding the judicial processes and interpretations.
Id. Llewellyn held Cardozo in high regard, even praising Cardozo in his book, The Common Law Tradition, for
Cardozo's ability to interpret documents in their commercial context to make sense of the parties' dealings.
RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 16 (1990).
35. TwINING, supra note 11, at 106.
36. Id.
37. KARL. N. LLEWELLYN, PRAJUDIZIENRECHT UND RECHTSPRECHUNG IN AMERIKA: EINE
SPRUCHAUSWAHL MIT BESPRECHUNG (1933). See Karl N. Llewellyn et al., The Case Law System in America,
88 COLUM. L. REV. 989 (1988), for a translated and published version of the work. The University of Chicago
published the English translation, The Case Law System in America, of this German work in 1989. Thomas
Adam, Llewellyn, Karl Nickerson, in GERMANY AND THE AMERICAS: CULTURE, POLITICS, AND HISTORY 690,
690 (2005).
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piece, it "presented an unusually bold and sophisticated account of the practical function-
ing of American case law" 39 and solidified Llewellyn's interest in:
[T]he processes and techniques of judicial decisions, as well as in the doctrines
that could be extracted from them and he began to realize how much general j u-
risprudential writing was based on the selective use of examples rather than on the
disciplined testing of the hypotheses against the facts of daily practice. 40
The book is also remarkable because it included a number of opinions by U.S.
courts, which he had translated to use them in his course. Llewellyn felt that German ju-
rists had not been given enough source materials to get a clear picture of the American
variety of the common law tradition. 4 1 Unfortunately, the year when it was finally pub-
lished, 1933, also marked the ascendance of the Nazis to power, which obviously cut off
critical debates, thus making it harder for the book to become influential in Germany. 42
The success of his first stint as visiting professor in Germany suggests that he was
well-integrated into German university culture and life. Moreover, in 1931, Llewellyn
was again invited to lecture as a visiting professor at Leipzig.4 3 One the basis of his in-
troductory lecture to legal sociology he started to work on another book, entitled Recht,
Rechtsleben und Gesel/schaft [Law, the Life of Law, and Society].44 This piece was writ-
ten in the tradition of Ehrlich, whom he had the opportunity to thoroughly read during
his first visit to Germany, and "represents Llewellyn's first sustained attempt to develop
a sociological theory of law." 45 It was not published until 1977, since the Great Depres-
sion put the prospective publisher into dire financial circumstances and the manuscript
was only rediscovered and published by the Swiss legal sociologist Manfred Rehbinder
decades later.4 6
Llewellyn's return to Germany to advance his academic career undoubtedly had a
profound impact on his scholarship and jurisprudential philosophy. While in Leipzig,
"Llewellyn had close contact with a number of distinguished German scholars," 4 7 in-
cluding Hermann Kantorowicz,48 who had lectured at Columbia in 1927 and most likely
38. Adam, supra note 37, at 690.
39. TWINING, supra note 11, at 106.
40. Id. at 106-07.
41. Ansaldi, supra note 13, at 713. See id. at 720-45, for a detailed summary of the book.
42. Christian Joerges, David M. Trubek & Peer Zumbansen, German Perspectives and Fantasies, 12
GERMAN L.J. 10, 20 21 (2011).
43. TWINING, supra note 11, at 106-07.
44. LLEWELLYN, supra note 15, at 8-9. On the significance of Eugen Ehrlich see infra Part III.B.
45. TWINING, supra note 11, at 107. Unfortunately, this book has not yet been translated into English.
Ansaldi, supra note 13, at 720.
46. Rehbinder, supra note 15, at 8 9 (describing the book's history); See also Ansaldi, supra note 13, at
720. See id. at 745-70, for a summary of the content of the book.
47. TWINING, supra note 11, at 107.
48. Id. Llewellyn described Kantorowicz as follows:
And then there was Kantorowicz. As a legal historian, he rates at least with Holmes. As a logistician
and technician, he rates only one notch under Jerome Michael [professor at Columbia Law School]
himself. As an embodiment of vanity, he rates above any but one I have known. But Kantorowicz
said to me with fervor, and at the height of his career: "I would give everything I have done, and
more, to have written Gny's Mthode." And Kantorowicz was not a Natural Law man.
KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 422 n.46 (1960) (emphasis in the
original). Llewellyn especially admired Kantorowicz's Geny's Method, written in 1899, because of its empha-
sis on the importance of common law on French legal tradition. See ROBERTA KEVELSON, CHARLES S.
2012 99
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organized Llewellyn's visit to Leipzig. 49 He also gave lectures at a number of German
universities, all the while developing and maintaining an "excellent reputation among
German scholars."5 0
Upon Llewellyn's return to Columbia, he had all but abandoned the formalist ap-
proach to jurisprudence. He and Jerome Frank advocated a sociological approach to j u-
risprudence. 51 There was a notable effort urging a more sophisticated articulation of the
realist philosophy, evidenced in his major works published in 1929: The Bramble
Bush,52 Cases and Materials on the Law of Sales,53 and several articles on
ism.54 This shift in perspective coupled with the published literature solidified Llewellyn
as a co-leader in the American realist movement and as a key protagonist in the realist
controversy that broke out in the academic legal world.55
Stimulated by this intellectual revolution, Llewellyn published a prodigious
PIERCE'S METHOD OF METHODS 72 (1987). On Kantorowicz' significance, see infra Part III.B.
49. Ansaldi, supra note 13, at 711.
50. TWINING, supra note 11, at 108.
51. DRAGAN MILOVANOvIC, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 110 (3d ed. 2003). American
Realism is best represented by Karl Llewellyn and Jerome Frank. As Dragan Milovanovic expounds in his
book:
They [Jerome Frank and Karl Llewellyn] viewed law more as a social science. Sociology, econom-
ics, psychology, and philosophy would be their guide. Their laboratory was the real world. Pragma-
tism was their philosophy. Their focus was on judicial decision making and its non-formal (extra-
legal) aspects. The law, for them, had become stagnant. It had ossified into formal procedures that
did not allow equitable justice. They challenged the stated ideal of certainty and predictability in de-
cision making (assumedly assured by abiding by the letter of the law), the strict emphasis on prece-
dents (stare decisis), and the reliance on abstract and syllogistic reasoning. Their method was a so-
cio-legal critique. They were to apply various sociological findings to the sphere of jurisprudence.
Id.
52. See generally KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: THE CLASSIC LECTURES ON THE LAW AND
LAW SCHOOL 20 (Oxford Univ. Press 2008) Bramble Bush is one of the most popular books serving as an in-
troduction for law students relating to what the law is, how to read cases, how to prepare for class, and how
justice in the real world relates to the law.
53. See generally KARL N. LLEWELLYN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF SALES ix xii (1930) In
this book, Llewellyn explains his views on teaching law, teaching the law of sales, sales as a case-method
course in the second year, and the net purpose of annotations. He expands on the importance of reading cases in
depth to fully understand them and to appreciate the law of sales in judicial action.
54. Some examples of his work include: Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism - Responding to
Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REv. 1222 (1931) (responding to Roscoe Pound's attack on the Realists); Karl N.
Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence -- The NextStep, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (1930) (exploring the different
concepts of law and, in particular, addressing the difficulty in framing any one concept of law because there are
many to include). Llewellyn and Pound had differing views regarding the significance of Legal Realism. Llew-
ellyn strongly believed, "What realism was, and is, is a method, nothing more, and the only tenet involved is
that the method is a good one." Brian Z.Tamanaha, Understanding Legal Realism, 87 TEX. L. REV. 731, 737-
38 (2009). On the other hand, Pound wanted to explore Realism more as a full-blown jurisprudential theory.
Most historians view this separation of ideas as "less a battle over substance than an unintended collusion that
followed from a clash of egos." Id at 738.
55. See TWINTNG, supra note 11 at 108-09. Though the majority of Llewellyn's references were to Ameri-
can works:
[l]t was the stimulus of having to interpret American law to foreign audiences that led him to take a
sustained look at the system as a whole from the outside and prompted his first two substantial
works of general theory. These works, written in German, while he was in close contact with Ger-
man scholars and German literature, mark the start of his original contributions to jurisprudence.
From now on he was no longer merely an acolyte of Corbin, Hohfield, Cook, and Moore, but a fully
fledged jurist in his own right.
Id.
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amount of work in the 1930s. 56 He once again had the opportunity to return to Leipzig in
1931 through 1932 and took this opportunity to extensively travel throughout Germany,
no doubt exposing himself to the latest intellectual debate and juristic evolutions of the
time. 57
During the 1930s, the scope of his intellectual capacity truly began to shine. First,
Llewellyn reached new audiences when he published a book of poems58 and a pamphlet
of lyrics. 59 Second, in 1933, Llewellyn collaborated with Edward Adamson Hoebel and
William T. Ross on a number of studies of American Indian Law. This practical experi-
ence eventually led to the publication of The Cheyenne Way, "a major contribution to the
anthropological study of primitive law."60 Third, his involvement in the Sacco- Vanzetti
56. Along with major books as The Bramble Bush and Cases and Materials on the Law of Sales, Llewellyn
published over twenty articles and related pieces. "The great majority of published and unpublished works
were concerned with the sociology of law, contracts, and commercial law." TWINING, supra note 11, at 109.
57. See id. at 110.
58. Llewellyn "continued to write poetry throughout his life and used poetry as one of his many tools in his
exploration of human interaction in law, custom, and social convention." Robert Whitman, Peter Dinunzio &
Elinor Kim, Karl N. Llewellyn: How Icelandic Saga Literature Influenced the Scholarship and Life ofan Amer-
ican Legal Realist, 39 CONN. L. REv. 1923, 1958 (2007). Many of Llewellyn's ideas were influenced by medi-
eval Icelandic literature, and [i]n modern America, like in Iceland, Llewellyn saw dangers in separating citi-
zens from their law." Id. Similarly, his other poems: "Come queen be kind," "Let law be alive!" and "Peace for
the people," illustrate his beliefs of the American legal system, which are derived from the Njal's Saga. See id.
Furthermore, Llewellyn privately published a book of poems named Put in His Thumb. KARL N. LLEWELLYN,
PUT IN His THUMB (1931). In this book, Llewellyn notes that [t]here is some virtue in dilettantism in the arts;
when art-for-fun moves from dabbling into sustained and honest effort, it has the same chance for contribution
that fresh infusion brings to any line of work." Id. at v; see also Robert W. Whitman, Henry F. Murray & Peg-
gy M. Pschirrer, The Poetic Imagination of Karl Lleiwellyn, 29 U. TOL. L. REV. 27, 33 (1997). Hull describes
Llewellyn as "an authentic anomaly among his generation- a romantic Realist." N. E. H. Hull, The Romantic
Realist: Art, Literature and the Enduring Legacy of Karl Llewellyn's 'Jurisprudence,' 40 AM. J. LEGAL HiST.
115, 116-17 (1996) (emphasis in the original). Llewellyn immersed himself in words of a broad range of poets
and novelists. He surveyed the works of "Rudyard Kipling, Bret Harte, Joel Chandler Harris's 'Uncle Remus'
stories, William Makepeace Thackeray, the Arabian Nights . . . and 0. Henry." Id at 118. Also, for his un-
published and undated student paper named "The Best Short Story Poem," he received a grade of "Very Good
+ +" from his instructor. Id. at 118 nn.12-13. His poetic style can be seen in his legal writings, which has been
attractive for legal scholars.
59. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, BEACH PLUMS (1931). Beach Plums is an eight page published work composed
of poems and ballads written by Llewellyn. Takeo Hayakawa, an accredited expert in Llewellyn's poetry,
opined that Llewellyn took himself very seriously as a poet. Hayakawa noted, "[w]hile certainly some of Llew-
ellyn's product was intentionally 'art for fun,' other of his output was heartfelt and intended to be taken seri-
ously, particularly by the middle to late 1930s." HULL, supra note 1, at 220. Even Llewellyn's widow, Soia
Mentschikoff stated that Llewellyn "took more pride in poetry than anything else-even jurisprudence." Id.
Further evidence that Llewellyn considered himself a serious poet was that he "took the trouble to have two
volumes of his poetry privately published, personally promoted their sale among colleagues and friends, sub-
mitted his verse (though unsuccessfully) to prestigious magazines, and included his poems in so many of his
other writings[.]" Id.
60. TWINING, supra note 11, at 111. An excerpt from The Cheyenne Way reads as follows:
Take American legal institutions and more particularly our ways of legal work and thinking, as con-
trasted with the German ways during two decades on either side of completion in 1897 of their Civil
Code. In the forefront of American legal thinking is the judge ... [while] advocates and counselors
sink slowly into anonymity, and legislators tend to; not so that judge whose mark is stamped upon
the law. . . Now in contrast to this, the German attitude strained constantly and consciously toward
rigorous articulation and intellectualization of juristic thought. . . . The center of German juristic
method was for decades not the judge, but the systemic scholar, and after him the "the legislator,"
who had cast authoritative law into words of rigid command and limitation- both abstract thinkers of
abstract thought.
KARL N. LLEWELLYN ET AL., THE CHEYENNE WAY 310-11 (1941).
What concerns us is that when, with these other legal systems in mind, we turn to the Cheyenne
materials, we meet a curious phenomenon. It is not merely that we find neat juristic work. It is that
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case61 allowed him to provide great assistance to the National Association for the Ad-
vancement of Colored People ("NAACP") as well as the American Civil Liberties Union
62 63("ACLU").62 This enlivening experience even prompted Llewellyn to run for office.
These experiences influenced his efforts toward making legal services more accessible to
the poor and to the lower middle class.64 Lastly, Llewellyn "published a notable series of
articles on the law of sales" 65 and lectured on American state appellate courts during the
1930s as well.66
the generality of the Cheyennes, not alone the "lawyers" or the "great lawyers" among them...
worked out their nice cases with an intuitive juristic precision which among us marks a judge as
good; that the generality among them produced indeed a large percentage of work on a level of
which our rarer and greater jurists could be proud.
Id. at 312-13.
61. On April 15, 1920, a robbery of a shoe factory in South Braintree, Massachusetts, ended with the shoot-
ing of a paymaster and his guard. PAUL AvRICH, SACCO AND VANZETTI: THE ANARCHIST BACKGROUND 3
(1991). Nicola Sacco was a shoe maker and Bartolomeo Vanzetti was a fish peddler. Id. Being Italian immi-
grants and anarchists, they were both brought to trial during the height of the Red Scare. Id. It was an atmos-
phere of great hostility and the judge in the case, Webster Thayer, echoed the country's acrimony toward for-
eigners: "Outside the courtroom, during the trial and appeals which followed, he made remarks that bristled
with animosity towards the defendants ('Did you see what I did with those anarchistic bastards the other day? I
guess that will hold them for a while.')" Id. at 3-4. The persecution of radicals and immigrants sparked Llewel-
lyn's interest. Both Llewellyn and future Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter, then a law professor at Har-
vard, were involved in this case. Llewellyn soon began working on reforms indicated by the case and to estab-
lish the innocence of Sacco and Vanzetti while Frankfurter rallied "respectable" opinion behind Sacco and
Vanzetti. Three days before their execution, Llewellyn:
[D]elivered a radio address seeking commutation of sentence on broader grounds: 'Daily in every
city you are permitting lawyers to win-or lose-cases by playing on the passions of the jury-
murder cases, accident cases, every jury case . . . You sit and let it happen: the open invitation to an
unfair trial ... we must awake to our responsibilities ... if a hundred and a thousand of such cases
are not to go on occurring without notice.'
LIEBMANN, supra note 16, at 174. After the execution, Llewellyn joined the council of the Sacco-Vanzetti Na-
tional League and planned to write a book about the case, but the final section was never completed after the
league was dissolved. TWINING, supra note 11, at 346. The main argument of the book was:
[T]hat all the public can do about it is to kick the civil bar; that the problem of improvement is a
technical one, and that only technicians are equipped to handle it. And finally, that until the civil bar
gets kicked into a sense of its duty as a public watchdog over criminal procedure, we get no reforms
on the legal side, as distinguished from the administrative side.
Id. at 347.
62. The writing of The Cheyenne Way motivated Llewellyn to get involved with other "liberal" causes such
as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People ("NAACP") and the American Civil Liber-
ties Union, with particular interest in laws to liberalize the sedition acts. TWINING, supra note 11, at 110.
63. In 1934, Llewellyn was a candidate backed by 'the Knickerbocker Democrats' for membership of the
Democratic State Committee (11th District). Id He vowed to "'clean up Tammany Hall'" and by this time, he
was somewhat of a public figure. Id. However, he decided to resign one day before polling day to allow a can-
didate sharing the same platform to take his place. Id. He was knocked out because of his fighting for the Ger-
mans in World War 1.
64. Id
65. Id. at 111.
66. LLEWELLYN, supra note 48, at 5 (discussing the various actions in American appellate courts). In 1941,
Llewellyn gave two lectures on American state appellate courts at the University of Chicago entitled "The
Good, the True, and the Beautiful in Law" and at Yale on "The Common Law Tradition." See Karl N. Llewel-
lyn, On The Good The True, The Beautiful, In Law, 9 U. CHI. L. REv. 224 (1942). In an excerpt from Llewel-
lyn's book, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals, he eloquently presents the problem:
You cannot listen to the dirges of lawyers about the death of stare decisis (of the nature of which
lovely institution the dirge-chanters have little inkling) without realizing that one great group at the
bar are close to losing their faith. You cannot listen to the cynicism about the appellate courts that is
stock conversation of the semi- or moderately successful lawyer in his middle years without realiz-
ing that his success transmutes into gall even as it comes to him.
LLEWELLYN, supra note 48, at 4.
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Given his well-rounded experience and the need for written uniformity regarding
the law of sales, it is no surprise that by the 1940s Llewellyn's work primarily revolved
around the Uniform Commercial Code.67 As the chief reporter for the UCC, this enor-
mous undertaking became his monumental task.68 Still, he also managed to publish "ar-
ticles on jurisprudence, legal education,69 the legal profession, and commercial law" 70
during this time. He also continued his study of American Indians. 71
As a leading member of the American realist movement, it is worth noting that
Llewellyn remained a skeptic of the adjudicatory process because he disagreed with the
view of law as a system of rules. During his prime years as a realist philosopher, Llewel-
lyn rejected the theory that rules decide cases. However, later in his academic career,
Llewellyn became less extreme in his beliefs and put forth that the rule of law plays a
significant role in the legal institution.72
One can speculate that such academic success placed a tremendous toll on his per-
sonal life; in 1946, Llewellyn divorced his second wife, Emma Costvet, in order to marry
Soia Mentschikoff. 73 Soon thereafter, he left Columbia Law School for a joint appoint-
67. Robert Whitman, Dom Calabrese, & Peggy Pschirrer, Karl Llewellyn s Letters to Emma Cortsvet Llew-
ellyn From the Fall 1941 Meeting of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 27
CONN. L. REV. 523, 524 (1995). While a professor of law at Columbia University, Karl N. Llewellyn was
named by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL") as Chief Reporter
for the UCC project. Id. His third wife, Soia Mentschikoff, was Associate Chief Reporter. Id. The project was
designed for the Uniform Commercial Code "to improve the law of sales, to integrate it with contract law so
that it could take effective account of promises, and to make it uniform across the states." W. DAVID SLAWSON,
BINDING PROMISES: THE LATE 20 T"-CENTURY REFORMATION OF CONTRACT LAW 133 (1996).
68. See Shael Herman, The Fate and the Future of Codification in America, 40 AM. J. LEGAL. HIST. 407,
429 (1996). Llewellyn knew that American lawyers thought codification of commercial law was nearly impos-
sible. Therefore, his role for drafting a successful code or "one that would not gather dust on a shelf' meant
that "a drafter had to figure out its role in a lawmaking apparatus and the appropriate balance between judicial
and legislative lawmaking." Id. In other words, a successful code requires what he called a loose precedent,"'
which was "located somewhere between jurisprudence constante and strict stare decisis, assured that American
courts, instead of ignoring the code, would adhere to the code and view new cases through the prism of the
code's verbal symbols." Id. at 432.
69. In 1944, he was chairman of an Association of American Law Schools ("AALS") committee on curric-
ulum "which produced a notable report on the place of skills in legal education." TWINING, supra note 11, at
111. Llewellyn's report of the AALS Committee on Curriculum is even noted by some scholars as the start of
the modern skills movement, or basically the skills and competency associated with the legal education.
WILLIAM TWINING, LAW IN CONTEXT: ENLARGING A DISCIPLINE 192 (1997).
70. TWINING, supra note 11, at 111.
71. Working with Hoebel again, Llewellyn began another study of American Indians: the Pueblos of New
Mexico. TWINING, supra note 11, at 111. In 1956, Llewellyn dove into the political life of the Pueblos:
During his visits to New Mexico, he became actively involved in Pueblo affairs; he drafted codes
for some of the Pueblo councils, he acted in a number of cases, and ultimately his interest in Indians
affairs led to his appointment to the Commission on the Rights, Liberties, and Responsibilities of
the American Indian.
Id. at 111-12.
72. See generally LLEWELLYN, supra note 52.
73. Soia Mentschikoff was once Llewellyn's "student, research assistant, and Associate Chief Reporter on
the Code." TWINING, supra note 11, at 112. From 1941 to 1948, she created quite a reputation for herself as "an
outstanding commercial lawyer in her own right" and became "the first woman to teach at Harvard Law
School." Id. Llewellyn met Soia when she entered Columbia Law School in 1931. During her stay at Colum-
bia, Soia worked as an assistant for Karl and had her own desk in his office at the law school. A friendship
soon developed; in fact, when the tragic news of Soia's lover's death arrived, it was Karl who chose to deliver
the War Department's grim telegram. At some point, while Karl was still married to Emma Corstevet, a love
relationship developed between Soia and Karl; neither Soia nor Karl ever openly spoke about the subject of
their relationship before their marriage. Robert Whitman, Soia Mentschikoff and Karl Llewellyn: Moving To-
gether to the University of Chicago Law, School, 24 CONN. L. REv. 1119, 1128 (1992).
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ment with Soia at the University of Chicago Law School. 74 From 1951 to 1962, he
served as a professor at the University of Chicago Law School until his untimely death
on February 13, 1962.75 Dean Levi of the University commented on some of Llewellyn's
academic and personal strengths:
Karl's many-sidedness was reflected in the radius of his influence at Chicago....
His influence was strong for instruction in draftsmanship. His concern for instruc-
tion in the skills of the craft produced the course in advocacy, which he taught,
and gave impetus to student work in moot court and legal aid. . . . His last year of
law teaching was perhaps his best. The barrier between teacher and student was
low; the creative power of the teaching was strong. He did not regard his work as
finished. He still had before him a work on law in society.
Before he died, Llewellyn published his last great work, The Common Law Tra-
dition: Deciding Appeals. Unfortunately, Llewellyn was unable to make another
scheduled trip back to Germany.79
PART II.
A. German Jurisprudence in the 1 9 th Century
Rudolf von Jhering is known to have "led the revolt against philosophical ab-
straction and conceptualism in German jurisprudence and the glorification of logic as a
juristic method." This established Jhering as the "pioneer of the basic modern trends in
jurisprudence."81 During much of the nineteenth century, German legal thought was
dominated by the historical school founded by Friedrich Carl von Savigny, who pro-
posed a "science of law" as an independent discipline. 82 In one of his most famous es-
74. Whitman, supra note 73, at 1124, 1130.
75. See id at 1130, n.24.
76. TWINING, supra note 11, at 113.
77. Llewellyn is said to have died of a heart attack. Id. at 112. Because he suffered from depression and
alcoholism, suicide was also a possible cause of death. Id. at 109.
78. The central theme of The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals is eloquently stated here:
No rational observer of the American legal system suggests that the process of deciding appellate
cases is simply a matter of searching out the single right answer. Yet, this very awareness that the
judicial process often involves the necessity of choice between two or more possible results occa-
sions further uneasy inquiry. If there is sometimes no single right answer, and if we must therefore
accept judicial creativity, what then of the lawyerIs once immutable canon of truth, stare decisis?
What then can the lawyer more than any layman offer in the way of predictability?
Robert B. McKay, Reviewv of The Common Law Tradition, 49 CALIF. L. REv. 778, 778 (1961) (book review).
79. In 1962, Llewellyn was invited to give a lecture in Germany, and this was to be his last statement on his
juristic views. TwINING, supra note 11, at 113.
80. William Seagle, Rudolf Von Jhering: Or Law as a Means to an End, 13 U. CHI. L. REv. 71, 71 (1945-
1946) (Rudolf von Jhering might appropriately be called the "Mark Twain of German jurisprudence."). Rudolf
von Jhering was a German jurist, born August 22, 1818 in East Friesland, where his father practiced as a law-
yer. Id. at 76. After receiving his law degree, he soon established himself as a professor teaching Roman law at
Berlin in 1844, at University of Basel in 1845, at University of Rostock in 1846, at University of Kiel in 1849,
and at University of Gieen in 1851. In 1867, he became a professor at the University of Vienna, and in 1972
he moved to Gottingen. Id. He was often called the father of sociological jurisprudence and his ideas were sig-
nificant in developing "jurisprudence of interests" in Germany. Id at 86. He continued to work in Gottingen
until he died on September 17, 1892. Id. at 76.
8 1. Id. at 7 1.
82. Mathias Reimann, Nineteenth Century German Legal Science, 31 B.C. L. REV. 837, 839-40 (1990).
Friedrich Karl von Savigny was born in 1779 in Frankfurt and died in 1861 in Berlin. For a brief overview of
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says, Vom Beruf unserer Zeitffir Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft of 1814, he ar-
gued that the law developed from the Volksgeist [spirit of the people] that could be found
in the Roman law and not in codifications, which he famously opposed.83 A detractor of
enlightenment natural law theories, he believed that the optimal law could be derived de-
ductively in a rational manner.84 In his view, lawyers were in the best position to further
its organic development in an evolutionary process.85 Savigny, the founding father of the
German idea of Rechtswissenschaft [legal science]86 was an influence on opponents of
the codification movement in the United States and adherents of American classical
legal thought, who considered German scholarship as a model and a reference point.
American legal thought in this period is usually seen as representing an understanding of
the law as a coherent, logical, and value-neutral system. The legal realists of the 1920s
and I 930s later rebelled against these views. 89
Most famous for his eight-volume System des heutigen romischen Rechts [System
of Contemporary Roman Law],90 Savigny inspired generations of German scholars and
founded the "Historical School" of legal science; his students went on to systematically
expose the law and to explore its history. Scholars grouped into the "Germanist" and
"Romanist" camps, depending on whether they studied the Teutonic and medieval or
Roman sources of the legal system.91 This school of thought, which focused on the logi-
cal and systematic basis of the law and dominated throughout much of the Nineteenth
Century was later often described as Begriffsjurisprudenz [conceptual jurisprudence], a
somewhat derogatory term initially coined by Jhering.92 The adherents of both of its
branches, including Georg Friedrich Puchta, Bernhard Windscheid and Carl Gerber 93
continued to view the law as a coherent and logical system that needed to be viewed as
clearly separate from the social circumstances in which it operated. 94  "The
his work and legacy see Stefan Riesenfeld, The Influence of German Legal Theory on American Law: The Her-
itage of Savigny and His Disciplines, 37 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (1989).
83. FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, VoM BERUF UNSERER ZEIT FOR GESETZGEBUNG UND
RECHITSWISSENSCHAFT (1814). For a brief overview of the debate between Thibaut and Savigny, see Mathias
Reimann, The Historical School Against Codification: Savigny, Carter, and the Defeat of the Neiw York Civil
Code, 37 AM. J. COMP. L. 95, 97-98 (1989).
84. See RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 195 (2001).
85. See Reimann, supra note 83, at 110-11 (quoting a passage from Savigny's Beruf that explains how the
spirit of the law is channeled through the jurists).
86. Reimann, supra note 82, at 852.
87. Reimann, supra note 83, at 103-07.
88. Reimann, supra note 82, at 838.
89. Singer, supra note 2, at 499. But note that Holmes was the first to critically engage with Savigny's theo-
ries in the United States. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 207, 211, 218-19 (1881).
See POSNER, supra note 84, at 198 ("America's rejection of Savigny was announced in 1881 by Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr.").
90. 1-8 FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, SYSTEM DES HEUTIGEN ROMISCHEN RECHTS 1840-1849. This fa-
mous work was translated into English in 1880. See Riesenfeld, supra note 82, at 2-3.
91. Reimann, supra note 82, at 858.
92. RUDOLF VON JHERING, SCHERZ UND ERNST IN DER JURISPRUDENZ 337 (9th ed., Lind Int'l 2009)
(1884).
93. Grechenig & Gelter, supra note 2, at 345. Bernhard Windscheid was born in 1817 in Dusseldorf and
died in 1892. He was famous for influencing the formation of German Civil Code and for his study in Roman
law. He also served as a professor at Basel, Greifswald, Heidelberg, and Leipzig. Bernhard Groifeld, Compar-
atists and Languages in COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES: TRADITIONS AND TRANSITIONS 154, 171 (Pierre
Legrand & Roderick Munday ed., 2003).
94. See Vivian Grosswald Curran, Fear of Formalism: Indications of the Fascist Period in France and
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'Begriffsjurisprudenz'. . . reduced law to a game of induction and deduction." 95
While in his early career Rudolf von Jhering was a leading proponent of conceptu-
al jurisprudence, his scholarship underwent a remarkable shift around 1860. By advocat-
ing social utilitarianism and focusing on function rather than formal definition, Jhering
set himself apart from most other scholars of the time, who were "interested only in legal
history or the philosophy of law." 96 At a time when German jurisprudence was very in-
ward looking, Jhering took a broader view and strove for the high aim of a "'general ju-
risprudence' intended to embrace the legal phenomena of all peoples of all times in one
great view, of a 'universal legal history' as part of an idealistic history of mankind, im-
bued with the ideal of progress." 97
B. The Early Years of Rudolfvon Jhering: Life and Education
On August 22 of 1818 in East Frisia, Germany, Rudolf von Jhering was born to a
family of jurists and civil servants; among the most notable members was his great-great-
grandfather, Hermann Conring,98 a pioneering German legal historian of the seventeenth
century. 99 After leaving the gymnasium at the age of eighteen, Jhering studied law at
Heidelberg, Munich, Gottingen, and Berlin, where he became a student of Friedrich Karl
von Savigny. 100 At the conclusion of his studies, he began teaching Roman law at Basel,
Rostock, and Kiel. 10 1 In 1852, he went to Giessen to teach and write, gaining substantial
recognition with the publishing of Geist des Ramischen Rechts auf den verschiedenen
Stufen seiner Entwicklung [The Spirit of the Roman Law in the Various Stages of Its De-
velopment, published in three volumes from 1852-1865].102 He continued onto the Uni-
versity of Vienna in 1867, where he was ennobled by the Emperor, and returned to Got-
tingen, as a professor, in 1872.103
Germany of Judicial Methodology's Impact on Substantive Law, 35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 101, 155 (2002);
Grechenig & Gelter, supra note 2, at 345.
95. Reimann, supra note 82, at 864.
96. Seagle, supra note 80, at 73. ("[These jurists] paid little or no attention to the needs of practical juris-
prudence, which they left entirely in the not too capable hands of the practitioners. Since political unification is
the first prerequisite of any effectively functioning legal system, the task of the jurists would perhaps have been
hopeless.").
97. Max Rheinstein, Comparative Law and Conflict of Laws in Germany, 2 U. CHI. L. REv. 232, 233-34
(1935).
98. Seagle, supra note 80, at 76. Herman Conring was a German intellectual who focused on economics,
politics, and law. Born in 1606, he was no stranger to political controversies as he opposed the Holy Roman
Empire. Id.
99. Constantin Fasolt, Hermann Conring and the European History of Law, in POLITICS AND
REFORMATIONS: HISTORIES AND REFORMATIONS, ESSAYS IN HONOR OF THOMAS A. BRADY, JR. 113, 127
(Christopher Ocker, Michael Printy, Peter Starenko & Peter Wallace eds., 2007) ("[Herrmann Conring] has
therefore been called 'the founder of German legal history."'); Reinhard Zimmermann, Codification: History
and Present Significance of an Idea, 3 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 95, 99 (1995) ("In the middle of the 17"' century,
Hermann Conring shattered the Lotharian legend, according to which Roman Law had been introduced in Eu-
rope by way of a formal imperial enactment.").
100. Seagle, supra note 80, at 76.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Hasso Hofmann, From Jhering to Radbruch: On the Logic of Traditional Legal Concepts to the Social
Theories of the Law, to the Reneiwal of Legal Idealism, in 9 A TREATISE OF LEGAL PHILOSOPHY AND GENERAL
JURISPRUDENCE: A History of the Philosophy of Law in the Civil Law World, 1600-1900 301, 302 (Damiano
Canale, Paolo Grossi & Hasso Hofmann eds., 2010); Seagle, supra note 80, at 76.
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In his early years as a jurist, Jhering's jurisprudential philosophy remained a prod-
uct of his education. As a student of Karl von Savigny, he initially remained a supporter
of the historical school, and as a historian of Roman law, "he was really bent on a search
for its permanent usable elements." 104 Nevertheless, while still firmly grounded within
conceptual jurisprudence during that period, he went beyond the work of other Roman-
ists by emphasizing that ancient Roman law and the works of the classical jurists could
not continue to apply unmodified many centuries later, but that the spirit of Roman law
could be preserved to apply under changed circumstances. 105 Even then, he apparently
"began to have doubts in mid-career about the accepted view of law as an organic body
of rules and concepts."106 Given Jhering's almost Pauline conversion, the Geist des
Rbmischen Rechts remained unfinished, while its earlier volumes continue to be reprint-
ed. 107
C. The Later Years ofRudolf von Jhering: Scholarship and Philosophy
In 1860, Jhering's jurisprudential philosophy began to surface.108 Between 1860
and 1866, he anonymously published a series of six Confidential Letters that questioned
the prevailing jurisprudence of the time and criticized the divorce between theory and
practice.1 09 In 1872, Jhering published Der Kampf ums Recht, based on a series of lec-
tures he had held during his time at the University of Vienna, in which he decidedly dis-
tanced himself from his earlier writing. 110 Der Kampf [The Struggle for Law] stirred
much discussion because of the controversial content. It was taken as an "attack on the
historical school" because Jhering's theory was premised on the idea that "the law was
not a system of abstract rights but a method of reconciling conflicting interests." I In
contrast to the prevailing view, Jhering argued that legal cases could not be solved alone
on the basis of the body of enacted law, and that judges were not able to simply arrive at
their judgment through a process of logical deduction, but that social and situational fac-
tors had to be taken into account.112 Moreover, he emphasized that "the origin of law is
104. Seagle, supra note 80, at 77.
105. Reimann, supra note 82, at 862; see also Hofmann, supra note 103, at 303-05; Joerges et al., supra
note 42, at 14-15 (describing Jhering's development as a scholar).
1 06. James E. Herget & Stephen Wallace, The German Free Law Movement as the Source of American Le-
gal Realism, 73 VA. L. REV. 399, 407 (1987).
107. Hofmann, supra note 103, at 306.
108. Neil Duxbury, Jhering s Philosophy ofAuthority, 27 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 23, 24 (2007). As articu-
lated by Duxbury, Jhering's philosophy can be regarded as a "detailed attempt to answer this question":
[W]e carry our own ethical view into the past,' he maintained, for we tend to deny that law origi-
nates with 'naked egoism' and prefer instead to explain legal origins by reference to the idea of a
social contract- even though this idea 'is a pure construction without regard to actual history.' The
truth is more straightforward: through force an original 'norm' or constitution is established, and
with this norm 'the force of the stronger has laid down the law for the weaker.' The stronger may
well intend to bind themselves as well - though whether or not they do 'is immaterial for the signifi-
cance of the process which has thus been accomplished'; what matters is that 'law has been placed
in the world once and for all, and this fact can never be undone again.'
Id. at 25.
109. Seagle, supra note 80, at 79.
110. Hofmann, supra note 103, at 307.
111. Seagle, supra note 80, at 81. In this work, Jhering argued that law results from a conflict between real
interests, which was a radical and extremely influential idea.
112. Curran, supra note 94, at 155-56. Compare Oliver Wendell Holmes famous quotation, paralleling
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to be found in social struggles" and "urges every individual to the struggle for law" be-
cause according to him, "the life of law is a struggle, it can endure only if the individual
is ever ready and vigilant to defend his rights." 113
Jhering's final work on the philosophy of law was set forth in Der Zweck im Recht
[Law as a Means to an End, two volumes, 1877 and 1883]114 in which he developed his
critique into a fully developed new system that has been described as marking "an ep-
ochal turning-point in jurisprudence."1 5 It can best be summarized in the following
statement: "Law is not the highest thing in the world, not an end in itself, but it is merely
a means to an end, the final end being the existence of society."116 Hence,
"[c]onstructive jurisprudence was barren and bankrupt, and must be replaced by a system
of social mechanics."11 7 Instead, law should be a "system of reconciling conflicting in-
terests" not based on the "analysis and combination of legal principles, which jurispru-
dence had borrowed from mathematics" because "[I]egal principles cannot be extended
merely by a process of analogy; they [do] not contain in themselves the correct solutions
for every legal controversy." 11 8 Jhering's view, unorthodox for its time, seems remarka-
bly like the catchword of at least some American Legal Realists - that legal interpreta-
tion can legitimately be "purposive." 119
Jhering believed that the law should be studied not merely as a theory but in its
practical application.120 Jhering emphasized that "[t]he judge was not an automaton who
pronounced his judgments merely on the basis of pre-established legal principles."121
Jhering's main critique of law was that:
Our theory of law, it is only too easy to perceive, is busied much more with the
scales than with the sword of Justice. The one-sidedness of the purely scientific
standpoint from which it considers the law, looking at it not so much as it really
is, as an idea of force, but as it is logically, a system of abstract legal principles,
has, in my opinion, impressed on its whole way of viewing the law, a character
not in harmony with the bitter reality. This I intend to prove. 22
Jhering's perspective of law encourages people to take a more active role in de-
fending their legal rights even if it requires taking an aggressive approach because "the
Jhering's view: "The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience." HOLMES, supra note 89, at 1.
113. Seagle supra note 80, at 81.
114. DONALD L. SMITH, ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR: DEFENDER OF LIBERTY AND LAW 85 (1986) (Jhering char-
acterized the legal system into three categories involving rights that concerned the individual, state, and socie-
ty). In this work, Jhering studied law as the end product of a process of adjusting and resolving conflicting in-
terests. Id.
115. Hofmann, supra note 103, at 308.
116. SMITH, supra note 114, at 85 (quoting a letter Chafee sent to Ernest Angell). Jhering characterized the
legal system into three categories involving rights that concerned the individual, state, and society. In this
work, Jhering studied law as the end product of a process of adjusting and resolving conflicting interests. Id.
117. Seagle, supra note 80, at 84.
118. Id. at 83.
119. Julian B. McDonnell, Purposive Interpretation of the Uniform Commercial Code: Some Implications
for Jurisprudence, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 795 797-98 (1978).
120. Seagle, supra note 80, at 80.
121. Id. at 83.
122. RUDOLPH VON JHERING, THE STRUGGLE FOR LAW 5 (John J. Lalor trans., 2nd ed. 1915).
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life of the law is a struggle, - a struggle of nations, of the state power, of classes, of in-
dividuals." 123
PART Ill. THE INFLUENCE OF GERMAN JURISPRUDENCE ON AMERICAN JURISPRUDENTIAL
THEORY AND THOUGHT
A. The Foundations in America for the Reception of German Jurisprudence
German jurists, including Jhering, and the early twentieth century thinkers in-
volved in the free law movement had a significant impact on American jurisprudence
and eventually on the realist school. This comes as no surprise, if one accepts that most
juristic discoveries of the nineteenth century seem to have been made in Germany and
that German jurists enjoyed the highest reputation in Europe. 124
During the time that Jhering was developing his jurisprudential philosophy, the
legal conditions in both America and Germany had "strong similararities," thus making
the reception in America of German jurisprudence particularly easy.125 First, Germany
was struggling to adapt Roman law to the newly unified state while the United States
was figuring out how to adapt "English common law to the needs of a democratic and
increasingly industrialized nation.',126 Second, German jurisprudence had been dominat-
ed by the historical school, whereas American jurisprudence was characterized by the
"seventeenth and eighteenth century philosophy of natural rights thinly disguised as con-
stitutionalism."127 Finally, America was also struggling with the "tyranny of legal con-
cepts" and focused on solving problems involving vast social, political, and economic
interests by ignoring realities and applying "abstract conceptual concepts ... by a pro-
cess of pseudological analysis."1 28 This was most evident in treatises and Restatements,
which, in functioning much like the BGB, "represented the practical implementation of
the positivist legal philosophy in an extreme form."129 This period in U.S. jurisprudence
later came to be called "classical legal thought," and is often associated with the name of
Christopher Columbus Langdell.1 30 Like its German counterpart, Langdellian legal
thought adopted an understanding of law as a science, 13 1 where individual cases could
be explained within a coherent system, from which it would also be possible to deduce
the outcome of future cases.132 Classical legal thought in the United States not only par-
123. Id. at 1.
124. Herget & Wallace, supra note 106, at 402.




129. Herget & Wallace, supra note 106, at 430. BGB, the civil code of Germany, became effective on Janu-
ary 1, 1900 and served as a guide for other civil law jurisdictions such as China, Japan, Greece, and Taiwan.
See id. at 406-07.
130. E.g., MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 1870-1960, 129
(1992); DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT (Cambridge ed. 1998); Gary
Minda, One Hundred Years of Modern Legal Thought: From Langdell and Holmes to Posner and Schlag, 28
IND. L. REV. 353, 357-58 (1995).
131. Laura I. Appleman, The Rise of the Modern American Law School: How Professionalization, German
Scholarship, and Legal Reform Shaped Our System of Legal Education, 39 NEW ENG. L. REV. 251, 286 (2005).
132. E.g, Brian Leiter, Legal Realism, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 262-
263 (2d ed., Wiley-Blackwell 2010); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, MAIN CURRENTS IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT
2012 109
TULSA LAW REVIEW
alleled developments in Germany, but had apparently also been influenced by the Ger-
man historical school. 133
Such similar legal and juristic conditions made American jurists eager recipients
and promoters of the revolutionary concepts articulated by the German jurists. Much of
the revolt against the system of jurisprudence in place was influenced by Jhering. The
impact spread among many prominent figures such as Justice Holmes, 134 Roscoe Pound,
and their successors during the 1920s and 1930s, who are usually viewed as belonging to
the realist school. 135 Such events suggest that Karl Llewellyn was greatly influenced by
Jhering and German jurisprudence.
B. The German Free Law Movement
Jhering died in 1892, but he left a lasting imprint on German legal thought. One
current in legal thought that took his views to more radical conclusions was the free law
movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, which reached its peak just
before World War 1. It is crucial to understand the concepts behind the free law move-
ment in order to recognize its influences on the American realist movement. The free law
movement developed largely as a response to the inability of the leading jurisprudential
schools and the BGB to adequately address the issue of where a judge can go for guid-
ance, especially "when positive law is unclear or does not appear to address a question
presented by a case;"136 in other words, the objective was to address the case of a lacuna
or gap in the legal code. At the time of codification, leading jurists from the prevailing
schools were satisfied that "[e]verything a judge needed to know about the civil law was
contained in the BGB or could be deduced from it directly or from the concepts that its
346 (1993); Singer, supra note 2, at 496-97.
133. Appleman, supra note 131, at 274-97; Michael H. Hoeflich, Savigny and his Anglo-American Disci-
ples, 37 AM. J. COMP. L. 17 (1989); Duncan Kennedy, Two Globalizations of Law & Legal Thought: 1850-
1968, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 631, 637-48 (2003) (identifying a globalization of classical legal thought origi-
nating in Germany); Reimann, supra note 83; Stefan Riesenfeld, The Influence of German Legal Theory on
American Law: The Heritage of Savigny and His Disciples, 37 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (1989). See JOHN DAWSON,
THE ORACLES OF THE LAW 451 (1968). For a contemporary view, see Joseph H. Beale, The Development of
Jurisprudence During the Past Century, 18 HARv. L. REv. 271, 283 (1905) (suggesting that the historical
school "obtained a powerful hold" in the United States).
134. Oliver Wendell Holmes shared common views with Jhering; the two most prominent similarities were:
"their views of law as a result of constant struggle in society," and their sociological observations on legal theo-
ries matched one another. Mathias W. Reimann, Holmes 's Common Law and German Legal Science, in THE
LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 102 (Robert W. Gordon ed. 1992). See also, infra text at n.142.
Pound presented the heart of his sociological jurisprudence, a theory of interests, in 1963 in his work titled The
Spirit of the Common Law, which pays homage to Jhering. ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW
(Marshall Jones Co. ed. 1921).
135. Karl Llewellyn was instrumental in giving its name to legal realism in exchange with Dean Roscoe
Pound, who, in spite of sharing some views with the realists, criticized Llewellyn, and from whom Llewellyn
sought to set himself apart. See Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence - The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L.
REV. 431 (1930); Roscoe Pound, The Call for a Realistic Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1931). In his
response to Pound, Llewellyn compiled his famous list of legal realists that subsequently shaped the perception
of the movement. Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism - Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L.
REv. 1222, 1226 n.18 (1931) (establishing the criteria of realists). This has sparked some controversy, as it has
been argued legal realism should be seen as part of a broader current that includes thinkers such as Holmes and
Pound. Robert S. Summers, Pragmatic Instrumentalism in Twentieth Century American Legal Thought - A
Synthesis and Critique of Our Dominant General Theory About Law and its Use, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 861,
864-65 (1981) (grouping all legal realist thinkers together as "pragmatic instrumentalists"). HORWITZ, supra
note 130, at 171 (suggesting that Llewellyn's list provides a distorted picture of the realist movement).
136. Herget & Wallace, supra note 106, at403.
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terms implied."1 37 Jhering was among the first jurists to voice his skepticism that the
law, "through its organic unity, provided the answer to every possible case that could
come before a judge." 138
Francois G6ny, an influential French legal philosopher, expounded upon Jhering's
skepticism and concluded that "it is difficult to assess the practical influence" 139 of
German theories in France. Rather, it is drawn from the "objective sociological data-
social realities, needs, values, and nature of things." He also "recognized that this meth-
od of decisionmaking was nothing new; courts had been doing it all along. It was simply
time for jurisprudence to recognize the creative aspects of judging." 140
The Free Law movement as such is most often associated with the names of Her-
mann Kantorowicz and Eugen Ehrlich. Going further in their critique than Jhering, they
denied the significance of formal legal arguments (such as those based on the accepted
methods of interpreting the Civil Code), considering them a linguistic convention behind
which judges felt compelled to hide their actual motivations in deciding a specific
case. 14 1 Possibly the most prominent work representing this radical iconoclastic view is
Kantorowicz' Der Kampf um die Rechtswissenschaft [The Struggle for Legal Sci-
ence],142 published under the pseudonym Gnaeus Flavius. Kantorowicz "assail[ed] the
prevailing notions of proper juristic thinking and call[ed] for a new movement to tear
down the old scholastic type of analysis and build a new radical science to serve jus-
tice." 143 This work addressed many of the themes of the free law movement and even
gave the movement its name. 144 According to Kantorowicz, the main tenets of the free
law movement require:
The legal system does not need architects of logical construction but judges who
are trained to recognize psychological and sociological factors and who share the
legal consciousness of the people. The Administration of the law must be placed
in the hands of judges who are willing to invoke free law and whose education fits
them for the task. Such education would include the study of political science,
137. Id. at 407.
138. Id.
139. RENE DAVID & JOHN E. C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY 107 (1978).
Francois Geny was born in Baccarat, France in 1861 and died in 1959. He studied law at the University of
Nancy. His legal theories addressed problems of legal methodology and influenced the development of statuto-
ry law throughout Europe. See id. (noting Geny's influence on legislation through scientific research in
France).
140. Herget & Wallace, supra note 106, at 411.
141. E.g., Grechenig & Gelter, supra note 2, at 349-50.
142. MARGARET BARBER CROSBY, THE MAKING OF A GERMAN CONSTITUTION 59 (2008). Hermann Kan-
torowicz's essay, Der Kampf um die Rechtsivissenschaft [The Struggle for Legal Science], whose title is an
obvious allusion to Jhering's Der Kampfums Recht, was a radical writing that urged "an idealized appreciation
ofthe ability of English courts to consider social conditions in the administration of justice." Id. It was meant to
encourage judicial activism because "'the judge was entitled, indeed bound, to disapply a statute in any case
where to apply it seemed to him unjust or inappropriate." Id. (citation omitted).
143. Herget & Wallace, supra note 106, at 412.
144. Der Kampf um die Rechtswissenschaft "had an immediate impact, arousing heated debate and bitter
controversy, as had been the intention." Frank Kantorowicz Carter, Gustav Radbruch and Hermann Kantoro-
wicz: Two Friends and a Book - Reflections on Gnaeus Flavius 's Der Kampf um die Rechtswissenschaft
(1906), 7 GER. L.J. 657, 658 (2006). This manifesto termed the free law movement as Freirechtsschule and ac-
cording to Arthur Goodhart in 1958, "'it has probably been cited more frequently than any other legal essay
published during the present century.'" Id (citation omitted).
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economics, applied psychology, philosophy, and criminology. 145
Thus, Kantorowicz called for judges to use discretion to make greater use of social
science, thus considering the consequences of their decisions. However, the Free Law
School stopped short of suggesting that judges should not be bound by statutes.146
Another important example emphasizing social factors in law is Freie
Rechtsjindung undfreie Rechtswissenschaft [Free Finding of Law and Free Legal Sci-
ence], 14 7 by Eugen Ehrlich, 14 8 which lent its title to the movement. Ehrlich, one of the
founding fathers of legal sociology, in his writing "attacked the broad codification that
had taken place and assailed lawyers' technicalism" and "proposed that legal science
turn its attention away from conceptual gymnastics and toward the study of the operation
of law within its full social setting." 14 9 Both Ehrlich and Kantorowicz believed that it
was not the enacted law that provided the best guarantee for justice, but, rather, it was the
personality and qualification ofjudges. 150
While the radical free law movement was somewhat influential in early twentieth
century Germany, it was virtually over by the time of World War II and failed to exert a
transformative influence on German legal thought, unlike its American counterpart, legal
realism. Specifically for Kantorowicz, it was difficult to secure a permanent teaching po-
sition because of his political leanings, and he was not appointed as a professor in Kiel
until 1928 at age fifty-one. 15 1 Of Jewish ancestry, he was removed from his position by
the Nazis in 1933, which led him eventually to take refuge in the United States,152 where
he also took the opportunity to engage with and criticize American legal realism. 153 The
fates of other critical scholars were similar.154 Radbruch, another prominent member of
the free law school who remained in Germany during his last years, is often remembered
for expounding the view (now often considered a myth) in 1946 that legal positivism
145. Herget & Wallace, supra note 106, at 414.
146. Curran, supra note 94, at 162.
147. EUGEN EHRLICH, FREIE RECHTSFINDUNG UND FREIE RECHITSWISSENSCHAFT (Aalen Scientia 1987). In
this book, Eugen Ehrlich elaborates on the "juristic science in England" where he concludes that "English
method of applying law is practically a free finding of law." Walter L. Moll, Translator's Preface of EUGEN
EHRLICH ET AL., FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW Ii, Iv (Walter L. Moll trans., Transac-
tion Publishers rev. ed. 2002). By this, he means that when a new matter is brought to the courts, the facts of
the case may influence judicial decisions on its own, "independent" of legal materials. EUGEN EHRLICH ET AL.,
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 5 (Walter L. Moll trans., Transaction Publishers rev.
ed. 2002).
148. Eugen Ehrlich was born on September 14, 1862, in Czernowitz, Bukowina, Austrian Empire (now
Chemovtsky, Ukraine). Sidney Post Simpson, Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law, 51 HARV. L.
REv. 190, 190 (1937) (book review). After studying, practicing, and teaching law in Vienna, he became a full-
time professor at the Franz-Joseph University of Czernowitz in 1897. Id Observing significant differences be-
tween the Austrian law "on the books" and its implementation in practice in his remote and multiethnic region
of origin, he became one of the founding fathers of the sociology of law, and he was one of the first proponents
of the free law movement. Given that Czernowitz became part of Romania after World War I, Ehrlich would
have been required to teach in Romanian. Afflicted by health problems, he retired to Vienna, where he died in
1922. Id.
149. Herget & Wallace, supra note 106 at 411-12.
150. Curran, supra note 94, at 158.
151. Vivian Grosswald Curran, Rethinking Hermann Kantoroiwicz: Free Law, American Legal Realism and
the Legacy of Anti-Formalism, in RETHINKING THE MASTERS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 66, 67 (Annelise Riles
ed. 2001).
152. Id..
153. Hermann Kantorowicz, Some Rationalism About Realism, 43 YALE L.J. 1240 (1934).
154. Grechenig & Gelter, supra note 2, at 352 53.
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made the law a malleable instrument in the hands of the Nazis, and that judges should
refuse to enforce laws that reach an excessive level of injustice.155
Mainstream German private law jurisprudence turned to another legacy of
Jhering's, namely Interessenjurisprudenz Uurisprudence of interests], which was devel-
oped by Philipp Heck in the 1920s (building on Jhering's work), and the younger, similar
school of Wertungsjurisprudenz [jurisprudence of value judgments] that dominates to-
day. 156 While these schools recognized the significance of social factors to the juridical
process, which was emphasized by Jhering, they are based on a greater confidence in
statutory law. 15 7 Social factors are relevant to the required purposive (or "teleological")
interpretation of the law, namely insofar as they influenced the conflicting interests that
led to the enactment of the respective statute (according to Interessenjurisprudenz) or the
value judgment embodied in the legislative enactment (according to
Wertungsjurisprudenz).158
C. Reception of the Free Law Movement in the United States
Turning to the influence on American realism, Roscoe Pound was vital in bringing
the free law movement ideas into American jurisprudence.159 Pound read the free law
literature and he expanded on the concept of "living law," by distinguishing between the
"law in the books" and "law in action."160 There is some evidence of Jhering's direct in-
fluence on Pound where Pound draws upon Jhering's notion of law as a means to an end,
infusing the debate over whether law is made or found. 161
There were other American jurists who promoted the free law movement ideas.
First, Albert Kocourek 162 drew upon G6ny, Ehrlich, and Kantorowicz to summarize the
"free law position." 163 Second, John Chipman Gray1 64 cited Jhering and Savigny twen-
155. Gustav Radbruch, Gesetzliches Unrecht und iibergesetzliches Recht, 1 SUDDEUTSCHE JURISTEN-
ZEITUNG 105 (1946). See, Curran, supra note 94, at 151-53 (describing the debate about formalism and anti-
formalism in post-war Germany); Hubert Rottleuthner, Legal Positivism and National Socialism: A Contribu-
tion to a Theory of Legal Development, 12 GER. L.J. 100 (2011) (discussing various historical legal develop-
ments, including the influence of legal positivism on German jurist).
156. Grechenig & Gelter, supra note 2, at 352-53 (describing the development in Germany); Hofmann, su-
pra note 103, at 317-19 (pointing out similarities between Heck's Interessenjurisprudenz and Roscoe Pound's
"sociological jurisprudence").
157. Id. at 354.
158. Id. at 354-55.
159. See generally HULL, supra note 1.
160. Klaus A. Ziegert, Introduction to the Transaction Edition of EUGEN EHRLICH ET AL., FUNDAMENTAL
PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW xxxix (Walter L. Moll trans., Transaction Publishers rev. ed. 2002).
161. See generally RUDOLF VON JIHERING, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END (Isaac Husik trans., Bos. Book Co.
1913).
162. Herget & Wallace, supra note 106, at 426. Albert Kocourek was the Professor Emeritus of Law in the
Northwestern University School of Law. He was also an Editor-in-Chief of the Illinois Law Review, and he
"advocated both for local law journals and for a move to cooperative or regional publication for the general law
reviews." Dawn Clark Netsch & Harold D. Shapiro, Histories: 100 Years and Counting, 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1,
14 n.54 (2006). See also Editorial Notes, 19 ILL. L. REV. 161 (1924). Some of his famous works include: Evolu-
tion oflai, Philosophy ofLaiw, and Primitive and Ancient Legal Institutions.
163. Herget & Wallace, supra note 106, at 426.
164. See JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 62 (Aldershot, 2nd ed. 1997) John
Chipman Gray was a scholar of property law and a Professor at Harvard Law School. Stephen A. Siegel, John
Chipman Gray and the Moral Basis of Classic Legal Thought, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1513, 1528 (2001). He was
also the co-founder of the well-known law firm of Ropes & Gray. Id at 1527. Gray is known for: Restraints on
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ty-four times in his book, The Nature and Sources of Law. 165 Third, Benjamin
Cardozol 66 cited Pound, G6ny, Ehrlich, Kantorowicz, Gray and Jhering in his famous
book, The Nature of the Judicial Process. 167
The inception of the realist movement in the United States is thought to have
started with a "speech given by Professor Herman Oliphant to the annual meeting of the
Association of American Law Schools in 1927."168 This speech was a "call to action by
legal academics to storm the barricades of formalism and to breathe new life and realism
into their scholarship."l 69
However, Oliphant's speech only cited a select group of other realists, if at all. The
speech barely referenced Pound and it failed to mention German juristic influence. Why
was German jurisprudence downplayed? There are several reasons for this. First, Ger-
man scholarship was unpopular due to the anti-German sentiment surrounding World
War 1. The social and political atmosphere of the time, namely the growing threat of
World War II, made the belief in the legal institution popular. After all, Hitler's idea of
the "State" above all incited fear that legal realism could threaten the legal system in the
United States. Second, many legal scholars were not proficient in the German language.
Third, citing to German scholarship was avoided because those ideas had already been
absorbed into the works of Pound and Llewellyn. 170 Furthermore, around this time,
Pound was often not cited because of a scholarly debate with Llewellyn that had the im-
mediate effect of casting Pound "in the role of an anti-realist in the eyes of contemporar-
ies," and "by the time the movement caught on in the United States, Pound's own think-
ing had moved beyond realism." 171
PART IV. RUDOLF VON JHERING'S INFLUENCE ON THE LIFE AND WORK OF KARL
LLEWELLYN
A. Dismissal of German Jurisprudence
Commentary on American realism mainly attributed realist theories to other Amer-
ican realists. 172 This could be a reflection of the anti-German sentiment of the time, an
the Alienation ofProperty, The Nature and Sources ofthe Law, and The Rule Against Perpetuities. Id at 1528-
29.
165. See id. Gray's book dealt with the theory of law, in so far that it defined the "nature of the law in terms
of its analytical scope, expanding the number of sources and narrowing the concept of law." THE PHILOSOPHY
OF LAW: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 33 (Christopher B. Gray ed., 1999). Gray's analysis includes Friedrich von Savi-
gny's version of historical jurisprudence based on judicial discretion. See id
166. Benjamin Cardozo studied law at Columbia Law School for two years and after a successful career as
an attorney, he was elected to a fourteen-year term on the New York Supreme Court in 1913. RICHARD
POLENBERG, THE WORLD OF BENJAMIN CARDOZO: PERSONAL VALUES AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS I (Harvard
Univ. Press ed. 1997). Later, he served on the Supreme Court from 1932 until his death six years later in 1938.
Id. at 3.
167. See id at 2. In his renowned work, Cardozo immediately posed the question: "What is it that I do when
I decide a case?" Id. The answer really depends on a multitude of factors: whether precedent is applicable, what
sources of information are available, consideration of the social welfare, and opinions of justice and morals to
name a few.
168. Herget & Wallace, supra note 106, at431.
169. Id.
170. See generally HULL, supra note 1.
171. Herget & Wallace, supra note 106, at 433.
172. See, e.g., ERWIN HEXNER, STUDIES IN LEGAL TERMINOLOGY (Chapel Hill ed., Univ. of N. C. 1941).
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ignorance of German language, or the reception of these ideas into the scholarship of the
first American realists.
Llewellyn's later works express no homage to Jhering, and indeed Llewellyn's
"autobiographical accounts of his intellectual development place relatively little stress on
his connections with Germany." 173 One can argue that Llewellyn's German accultura-
tion and early interpretations of the works of German jurists make it obvious that Llewel-
lyn was, to some extent, under German influence. Llewellyn's years in Mecklenburg
were full, vibrant and must have helped him to build a basis to expand his thinking about
jurisprudence later on, enabling him to make full use of developments in German juris-
prudence, which had reached an early peak during that period, for his own work. At the
time of Llewellyn's visits, German private law theory had been profoundly influenced by
Jhering's legacy, and this influence was also apparent in the German scholars with whom
Llewellyn interacted. To suggest that Llewellyn's early years as a jurist were not influ-
enced by von Jhering does not diminish the great contributions made by Karl Llewellyn.
Perhaps Llewellyn subconsciously denied his German influences because he was una-
ware of how much German jurisprudence was integrated into his life. Or, perhaps Karl
Llewellyn consciously rejected German influence for fear that this would have a negative
effect on his career.
Furthermore, there is little room to argue that Llewellyn was insulated from the
major German affairs of the time, particularly involving the legal theory of Jhering. First,
Llewellyn was influenced by Jhering's crusade against conceptual jurisprudence: "Llew-
ellyn's antipathy to conceptual jurisprudence is legendary," and "[h]is campaign against
the use of 'heavenly concepts' to solve real problems is reminiscent of the struggle . . . of
Rudolf von Jhering." 174 Jhering viewed his juristic works as "akin to the work of alche-
mists ... driven by purpose, not invisible concepts;" therefore, Jhering pointed out that
"the life of the law was experience, not logic," and "maintained that "law had to be func-
tional."175
Second, Llewellyn expanded on ideas similar to those of Jhering, one being the
promotion of purposive interpretation. Llewellyn learned of purposive interpretation
through his study of Jhering, who was one of its greatest exponents.176 As a result,
Llewellyn believed that "[t]he language of a statute was relative, not absolute" and that it
"had to be understood in terms of its context." 177 Both jurists espoused that "law was a
means to preselected social ends, and that statutes could not be adequately understood by
references only to plain meaning and usage."1 78
Third, Llewellyn's views on the judicial function echoed Jhering's philosophy.
Llewellyn's work emphasized that law is merely a prediction of what the courts will ac-
Before 1933, Professor Hexner referenced works to German sources, and during 1933 to 1935, his main
sources were English publications. Many see this shift as Hexner's allegiance to American public opinion and
the political turmoil in Nazi Germany.
173. TWINING, supra note 11, at 108.
174. Shael Herman, Llewellyn the Civilian: Speculations on the Contribution of Continental Experience to
the Uniform Commercial Code, 56 TUL. L. REV., 1125, 1162 (1982).
175. Id. at 1162-63.
176. Id. at 1135-36.
177. Id. at 1136.
178. Id. at 1135-36.
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tually do. Instead, the legal actors should apply rules more scientifically and the judicial
law-creating process should be investigated by jurists. In order to derive these conclu-
sions, Llewellyn drew from "Jhering's discoveries in the area of latent legal rules and
legal fictions." 179
Finally, Jhering's inspiration is most recognizable in the Uniform Commercial
Code, though the features may only be cognizable to lawyers trained in the civil law. 180
Additionally, "[t]he whole modern American growth of administrative agencies, such as
boards and commissions, from the Interstate Commerce Commission to the National La-
bor Relations Board, owes much to Jhering's gospel of purpose and interest." 18 1 These
agencies used the UCC to "accomplish some particular social purpose or correct some
particular social abuse, but they [were] designed to fulfill their tasks without observing
all the techniques and procedures of the conventional legal system."
182
For instance, Section 2-615 of the UCC, "The Doctrine of the Failure of Presup-
posed Conditions" is based on a situation posed by Jhering that was later resurrected by
Bernhard Windscheid, and later by Paul Oertmann, as Geschdftsgrundlage [basic as-
sumption of the parties].183 While drafting the UCC, it is fair to conclude that Llewellyn
knew of Geschaftsgrundlage because he was a visiting professor in Germany at the time
when the doctrine was still much discussed. 184
PART V. CONCLUSION
Rudolf von Jhering's influence on Karl Llewellyn and the American realist move-
ment was substantial and meaningful. Jhering was the first jurist in Germany to set the
free law movement in motion, which largely and directly influenced the American realist
movement. As a leader of this realist movement, Llewellyn played a major role in rede-
fining how there is room to interpret the law. The German jurists, and particularly
Jhering, strongly influenced Llewellyn because Llewellyn held close, personal ties to
Germany and its culture. His legal works and constant interactions encouraged his ac-
ceptance into the German legal community. The American and German Realism move-
ment shared similarities despite the development of American anti-German sentiment
upon the rise of Adolf Hitler, and Nazism. While this development caused the link be-
tween German jurisprudence and realism in America to be purposely broken, Rudolf
Von Jhering, and other German jurists, undoubtedly helped to shape and motivate what
is known today as American Legal Realism.
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